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1 Introduction
In standard auction settings with independent private values (IPV) and risk neutral
bidders, traditional auction theory (e.g. Vickrey (1961)) gives a clear prediction on
which auction formats deliver higher expected revenue: So long as across auction
formats, each bidder receives the object with the same probability and the lowest
possible valuation type never wins, it does not matter. Experimental work (e.g.
Schramm and Onderstal (2008)) has shown, however, that the auction format does
matter for the revenue of the auctioneer. Schramm and Onderstal (2008) report
that the all pay auction (APA) yields higher revenue than the first price auction
(FPA). As an application of the theoretical work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) on loss aversion and reference dependent preferences,
Lange and Ratan (2010) incorporate gain loss preferences into the standard IPV
auction framework and find that the FPA dominates the Vickrey auction if bid-
ders are loss averse. In this paper, I show that the FPA is sub optimal for the
auctioneer and that the APA is preferred if bidders are loss averse. Moreover, I
extend the theory of mechanism design with risk neutral agents to settings with
loss averse agents and provide a version of the revelation principle and the revenue
equivalence theorem. It is shown that a revenue maximizing mechanism is an APA
with minimum bid, and that any mechanism with, from an interim view, uncertain
ex post payments is sub optimal. In addition, the results are compared to various
notions of risk aversion. In general, the revenue ranking across auction formats is
ambiguous with risk averse bidders. However, risk aversion in the money dimension
in conjunction with strong separability of preferences in the good and in the money
dimension leads to the same results regarding the revenue ranking across auction
formats. Additionally, every risk averse bidder participates in the auction, whereas
not every loss averse bidder necessarily does.
1.1 What this Paper is and is not about
The main goal of this paper is to establish the link between two popular and widely
studied areas of economic theory: behavioral economics and mechanism design.
Both of these areas have received increased attention in the recent past, so that
it seems as a next natural step to consider auction and mechanism design with
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boundedly rational agents. As explained below, all familiar results from the ex-
tensively studied risk neutral case follow as limiting cases of the theory presented
here. Additionally, the theory presented in what follows may provide an alternative
theoretical framework for understanding empirical regularities. Finally, if bidders
are loss averse, for which there is a plethora of field and experimental evidence (e.g.
DellaVigna (2009)), the optimal sales mechanism is derived. Recent work on in-
corporating models of loss aversion (Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008), Herweg, Mu¨ller,
and Weinschenk (2010) (2010)) into market settings has helped to understand some
’puzzles’ that cannot be explained based on orthodox economic theory. However,
rather than attempting to convince the reader that loss aversion alone is what gov-
erns bidders’ decisions under risk, the objective of this paper is to inform about the
implications of the presence of loss averse bidders in auction settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the assumptions
made and a description of the auction environment. In section 3, I compare the FPA
and the APA; the derivation of the optimal auction can be found in section 4. Section
5 relates the results to the existing literature, before section 6 concludes.
2 Assumptions and Auction Environment
As proposed in Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), I assume that bidders’ preferences are
given by
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ) := θcg + cm︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηgµg(θ(cg − rg)) + ηmµm(cm − rm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
,
where cg, rg ∈ {0, 1} captures the good dimension, cm, rm ∈ R captures the money
dimension, ηl > 0, l ∈ {g,m} measures the weight attached to gain loss utility in
dimension l, and θ ≥ 0 is the bidder’s intrinsic valuation for the good (also referred
to as ’type’). Moreover,
µl(x) :=
{
x, if x ≥ 0
λlx, if x < 0,
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where λl > 1, l ∈ {g,m}. In contrast to the original formulation in Ko¨szegi and Ra-
bin (2006), I allow gain loss utility to have a different impact in the two dimensions.
These preferences capture loss aversion through the Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
value function1, µl, l ∈ {g,m}. A deviation from the reference point is disliked more
if it is a loss than it is liked if it is a gain.
I consider auctions of a single, indivisible object with N ≥ 2 loss averse bidders
who share the same ηl and λl, l ∈ {g,m}, and whose valuations, {θi}Ni=1, are the
realizations of N independent draws from the continuous distribution function, F :
Θ := [θmin, θmax] ⊆ R+ → [0, 1] with strictly positive density, f = F ′, everywhere.
The valuation of bidder i, θi, is assumed to be private information to bidder i.
In addition, I assume that the bidders and the auctioneer share the same prior
beliefs. While applying Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007)’s (2007) solution concept of choice
acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE), I focus on symmetric, strictly increasing
equilibrium bidding functions only.
Using Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006)’s notation, if the distribution of reference points is
G, and the distribution of actual consumption outcomes is H, the decision maker’s
ex ante expected utility is given by
U(H|G) :=
∫
{(cg ,cm),θ}
∫
{(rg ,rm),θ}
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ)dG(rg, rm, θ)dH(cg, cm, θ).
In the above described auction setting, each bidder learns his valuation before sub-
mitting his bid and therefore, maximizes his interim expected utility,
U(H|G, θ) :=
∫
{(cg ,cm)}
∫
{(rg ,rm)}
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ)dG(rg, rm|θ)dH(cg, cm|θ).
Definition 1 (Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007)) Conditional on the realization of the type,
θ, for any choice set, D, H ∈ D is an interim CPE if U(H|H, θ) ≥ U(H ′|H ′, θ),
for all H ′ ∈ D.
1This piece wise linear specification does not satisfy all the properties identified by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and chosen for expositional convenience. In appendix A.2, I allow for a more
general form of µl by introducing diminishing sensitivity. It is shown that the results derived below
are robust to this extension.
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In the auction setting described above, fixing all other bidders’ behavior, each
bidder’s bid, bi, induces a distribution, Hi(A|bi, b−i), over the set of alternatives,
A := {0, 1}N × RN . Therefore, the definition can be modified in the following way
to match the auction setting under consideration.
Definition 2 Conditional on the realization of the type, θi, b : Θ → R+ is a sym-
metric interim CPE bidding function if for all i, θi, θ−i, b′ ≥ 0,
U (Hi(A|b(θi), b−i = b(θ−i))|Hi(A|b(θi), b−i = b(θ−i)), θi)
≥ U (Hi(A|b′, b−i = b(θ−i))|Hi(A|b′, b−i = b(θ−i)), θi) .
As laid out in Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007), CPE is the most appropriate solution
concept for decisions under risk, whose uncertainty is resolved long after the decision
is made. An alternative solution concept, choice unacclimating personal equilibrium
(UPE), requires the decision to be optimal, given the expectations at the time
the decision is made. In some auction settings, the outcome is announced long
after the bids are submitted; in others, the time elapsed between the submitted
bid and the announcement of the winner is comparatively short. Nevertheless,
because of two reasons, I consider CPE the most appropriate solution concept for
the analysis of auctions in the setting described above. First, what is important
is that the submission of the bid and the announcement of the outcome of the
auction are temporally separated. The uncertainty associated with an auction is
not exactly comparable to offering the decision maker a lottery, as e.g. a coin toss,
with immediate resolution of uncertainty and reception of pay offs. In an auction,
when making their decision, bidders are strategic about their submitted bid. An
interpretation of CPE is that bidders are required to also be strategic about the
reference dependence in their preferences. Second, bidders are not able to arrive at
the auction site with meaningful expectations about the resolution of uncertainty,
because the exact value of θ is not known until the object has been inspected, and
none of the bidders can be exactly certain about the number of opponents they
are competing with. Instead, once all relevant information has been collected, each
bidder is assumed to choose a bid that maximizes his interim expected utility, taking
into account the feelings he has after the auction is over. Besides loss aversion, this
modeling approach captures aspects of regret, disappointment, and relief.
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For the following analysis, it is convenient to define Λl := ηl(λl− 1) > 0, l ∈ {g,m},
which can be viewed as an overall measure of the degree of loss aversion in the
respective dimension. The following condition guarantees that all bidders participate
in the auction for any realization of their own type, and that their equilibrium
bidding functions derived below are actually strictly increasing.
Condition 1 (No Dominance of Gain Loss Utility) Λg ≤ 1.
This condition places, for a given ηg (λg), an upper bound on λg (ηg). In Herweg,
Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010), this condition is referred to as no dominance of
gain loss utility.
3 First Price vs. All Pay Auctions
In this section, I consider the following class of auctions with all pay component,
α ∈ [0, 1]. Bidders simultaneously submit their bid, and the bidder with the highest
bid wins the object and pays his entire bid. All other bidders walk away without
the object but have to pay α of their bid. For α = 0, we have the FPA and for
α = 1, the APA. Since winning ties happen with probability 0, any tie breaking
rule is applicable. Consider the ex post utility of bidder i when his bid is x, and
x−i is the vector of all other bidders’ bids. Let Pi(x) = P (i wins |x, x−i) = P (x >
maxj 6=i{xj}) be the probability that bidder i wins the auction, conditional on his
own and all other bidders’ bids. When he ends up with the object and pays x, his
utility is
θi − x︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηg (1− Pi(x)) θi − ηmλm (1− Pi(x)) (1− α)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
.
The first term represents intrinsic utility, and the second term captures gain loss
utility. Compared to the situation in which the bidder does not win the auction,
which happens with probability, 1−Pi(x), he experiences a gain in the good dimen-
sion and a loss in the money dimension. In case bidder i ends up without the object
5
and his bid is x, his utility is
−αx︸︷︷︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηgλgPi(x)(−θi) + ηmPi(x)(1− α)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
,
since, compared to the situation in which he wins the auction, which happens with
probability, Pi(x), this is considered a loss in the good dimension and a gain in the
money dimension. Therefore, bidder i’s interim expected utility is
Pi(x) (θi − x+ ηg (1− Pi(x)) θi − ηmλm (1− Pi(x)) (1− α)x)
+ (1− Pi(x)) (−αx− ηgλgPi(x)θi + ηmPi(x)(1− α)x) .
I look for strictly increasing, symmetric equilibrium bidding functions only. Hence,
dropping the i subscript, the bidder’s program is
Vα(θ) := max
x∈R+
{P (x) (θ − x+ ηg (1− P (x)) θ − ηmλm (1− P (x)) (1− α)x)
+ (1− P (x)) (−αx− ηgλgP (x)θ + ηmP (x)(1− α)x)}
= FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λg (1− FN−1(θ))) θ
−FN−1(θ) (1 + Λm (1− FN−1(θ))) (1− α)bα(θ)− αbα(θ),
where the ultimate equality follows from independence of the types, bα being strictly
increasing (and hence, invertible), and the definition of Λl, l ∈ {g,m}. For economy
of notation, let FN−1(θ) =: Fθ. By the envelope theorem2,
V ′α(θ) = Fθ (1− Λg (1− Fθ)) =: Γ(θ),
which implies that
Vα(θ) = Vα(θmin) +
∫ θ
θmin
Γ(s)ds.
Since in equilibrium, every bidder is playing a monotone strategy, it follows that
Vα(θmin) = 0, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Inserting this expression for Vα into the above
definition of Vα and solving for bα yields the following expression for the equilibrium
bidding function with loss averse bidders.
bα(θ) =
Γ(θ)θ − ∫ θθmin Γ(s)ds
(1− α)Fθ∆(Fθ) + α,
2Although µl, l ∈ {g,m} is not differentiable everywhere, because of the kink at the reference
point, the bidder’s value function is differentiable in θ.
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where
∆(Fθ) := (1 + Λm(1− Fθ)) ≥ 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose condition 1 holds. Then, bα(θ) is strictly increasing, for
almost all θ.
Proof: As shown in lemma 2 and lemma 3 in appendix A.3, condition 1 guarantees
that the bidder’s objective satisfies strictly increasing differences in (θ, x), so that
bα(θ), as the unique maximizer of this objective, is strictly increasing in θ. 
Let bRNα be the equilibrium bidding function when bidders are risk neutral (Λ
g =
Λm = 0). Then, the equilibrium bidding function with loss averse bidders can be
written as
bα(θ) =
1− Λg
ψα(θ)
bRNα (θ) +
Λg
ψα(θ)
κα(θ),
where
ψα(θ) :=
(1− α)Fθ∆(Fθ) + α
(1− α)Fθ + α ≥ 1 and κα(θ) :=
F 2θ θ −
∫ θ
θmin
F 2s ds
(1− α)Fθ + α .
bα is a distorted convex combination of bRNα and κα. The coefficients are distorted
by gain loss considerations in the money dimension, measured by ψα. In order to
study the equilibrium bidding behavior of loss averse bidders, it is instructive to
first consider the case, in which bidders are only loss averse in the money dimension
(Λm > 0) and risk neutral in the good dimension (Λg = 0). In this case, the
equilibrium bidding function reads
bα(θ) =
1
ψα(θ)
bRNα (θ).
If bidders only have gain loss considerations in the money dimension, then the
equilibrium bid is the distorted risk neutral bid. Regarding the comparative statics
results with respect to the parameter, Λm, the following holds.
Proposition 2 bα(θ) is strictly decreasing in Λm, for almost all θ, α ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof: Immediate by inspection. 
As gain loss considerations in the money dimension become more important, the
equilibrium bid is reduced. To see the intuition behind this result, consider a bidder
in auction α ∈ [0, 1). In case he wins the auction, he experiences a loss in the money
dimension; if he loses the auction he experiences a gain of equal magnitude. Since
losses weigh more than gains, the overall effect reduces the equilibrium bid. Another
insight about the effects of loss aversion in the money dimension can be obtained
by considering the distortion coefficient,
ψα(θ) =
(1− α)Fθ∆(Fθ) + α
(1− α)Fθ + α =
(1− α) (Fθ + ΛmFθ(1− Fθ)) + α
(1− α)Fθ + α ,
which is increasing in Fθ(1−Fθ), the variance of the Bernoulli distributed outcome
of winning or losing the auction. Additionally, ψα is decreasing in α, and ψ1 = 1.
If an increased fraction of the bid is paid for sure, gain loss considerations in the
money dimension become less important in distorting the equilibrium bid.
In order to examine how loss aversion in the good dimension affects the bidding
behavior, consider the case in which 1 ≥ Λg > 0 and Λm = 0. Then, the equilibrium
bidding function is given by
bα(θ) = (1− Λg)bRNα (θ) + Λgκα(θ).
Regarding the effect of an increase in Λg, we have
∂
∂Λg
bα(θ) = −bRNα (θ) + κα(θ) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ bα(θ) ≤ bRNα (θ)
⇐⇒ F 2θ θ −
∫ θ
θmin
F 2s ds ≤ Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds.
For θ = θmin, both the LHS and the RHS of the above expression are equal to
0. The derivative of the expression on the RHS is greater than the derivative of
the expression on the LHS if and only if Fθ ≤ 1/2, which implies that the bid of
the lowest types is always reduced by an increase in Λg, whether the bid of the
highest types is increased depends on the distribution, F , only. It is instructive to
consider a concrete example. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium bidding functions for
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N = 2 and θ ∼ U [0, 1], compared to the same situation with risk neutral bidders
(Λg = Λm = 0).
Figure 1: FPA and APA with Λg = 1, Λm = 1, N = 2, and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
In order to see the intuition behind the above results and the example, consider the
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equilibrium interim expected utility of a bidder of type θ, when following the above
prescribed strategy, bα,
Vα(θ) = Γ(θ)θ − Fθ(1− α)bα(θ)− αbα(θ)− ΛmFθ (1− Fθ) (1− α)bα(θ).
Also,
Vα(θ) =
∫ θ
θmin
Γ(s)ds,
so that the interim expected pay off of a bidder of type θ is identical, for all α. Now,
consider the case in which Λm > 0 and Λg = 0. Then,
Vα(θ) = Fθθ − Fθ(1− α)bα(θ)− αbα(θ)− ΛmFθ (1− Fθ) (1− α)bα(θ).
If α = 1, gain loss considerations have no effect on the interim pay off. As α de-
creases, gain loss utility becomes more and more important and reduces the interim
expected pay off. This is compensated for by reducing the equilibrium bid. Next,
consider the case where 1 ≥ Λg > 0 and Λm = 0. In this case, a bidder of type θ
seeks to maximize
P (x) (θ − (1− α)x)− αx− ΛgP (x) (1− P (x)) θ.
That is, his objective is the objective of a risk neutral bidder less a penalty term for
the variance of the Bernoulli distributed outcome of winning or losing the auction.
If only gain loss utility matters, utility maximizing behavior, in the absence of any
constraints imposed by equilibrium play, implies that x ought to be chosen such that
P (x) is either maximized or minimized. This translates into submitting either a very
high or a very low bid. Since in equilibrium, every bidder plays a strictly increasing
bidding strategy, low (high) types have to sacrifice more of their intrinsic utility
when submitting a high (low) bid than when submitting a low (high) bid, which
induces the same variance. Therefore, in the above example, the lowest types submit
a lower bid than in the risk neutral case, and the highest types bid more than under
risk neutrality. In general, whether and where the bidding function with loss averse
bidders intersects the one of risk neutral bidders depends on the distribution, the
number of bidders, the auction format, and the degree of loss aversion. Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2007) mention that loss averse decision makers are drawn towards certain
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outcomes. This translates into low types submitting low bids to be more certain to
lose the auction, and high types submitting high bids to be more certain to win the
auction.
So far, it has been assumed that condition 1 is satisfied. As Lange and Ratan
(2010) show, if condition 1 is not met, there are some bidders who choose to not
participate in the auction. This is also true in the auction setting studied here.
More specifically, the implications of a violation of condition 1 are the following.
Proposition 3 Suppose condition 1 does not hold, i.e. Λg > 1. Then, there is a
unique interior threshold, θ˜ ∈ (θmin, θmax), such that bα(θ) = 0, for all θ < θ˜, and
bα(θ) =
Γ(θ)θ − ∫ θθ˜ Γ(s)ds
(1− α)Fθ∆(Fθ) + α,
for all θ ≥ θ˜, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Additionally, θ˜ is strictly increasing in Λg and the
number of bidders, N .
Proof: If condition 1 does not hold, then, using that Λg > 1,
V ′α(θ) = Fθ (1− Λg (1− Fθ)) < 0⇐⇒
Λg − 1
Λg
> Fθ = FN−1(θ).
The LHS of the above inequality is independent of θ, and (Λg − 1)/Λg ∈ (0, 1), for
Λg > 1. The RHS is strictly increasing in θ. By continuity and monotonicity of F ,
there is a unique interior value, θˆ ∈ (θmin, θmax), satisfying(
Λg − 1
Λg
)1/(N−1)
= F (θ˜),
such that for all θ < θ˜, V ′α(θ) < 0 and for all θ > θ˜, V ′α(θ) > 0, so that V ′α(θ˜) = 0.
Since the LHS of the above expression is strictly increasing in Λg and N , θ˜ is strictly
increasing in Λg and N . Hence, all bidders with types θ < θ˜ receive strictly negative
interim expected utility from participating in the auction. These bidders can secure
themselves an interim expected pay off of 0 by submitting a bid of 0. Given the
behavior of the bidders with types θ < θ˜, it is optimal for all types θ ≥ θ˜ to submit
non negative bids, since for them, V ′α(θ) ≥ 0. Given the behavior of these types, it
is optimal for types θ < θ˜ to submit a bid of 0 and to not participate in the auction.

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This result indicates that when loss aversion in the good dimension is too pro-
nounced, there is a set of types of strictly positive measure, for which it is not
optimal to participate in the auction at all and submit a positive bid. The cut off
point, θ˜, is identical across all auction formats, α ∈ [0, 1]. In order to see the in-
tuition behind this, suppose that all bidders participate. The interim expected pay
off of bidder of type θ < θ˜ is
Vα(θ) =
∫ θ
θmin
(Fs − ΛgFs(1− Fs)) ds.
Again, the variance of the Bernoulli distributed outcome of winning or losing the
auction reduces the information rents. The above result says that, depending on
the value of Λg, this reduction can be too pronounced to make participation worth
while for the lowest types, since they have the lowest information rents to start with.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium bidding function for the APA in the setting of the
previous example in figure 1 if condition 1 is violated (Λg = Λm = 2). If loss aversion
is very pronounced (Λg > 1), it is not profitable for the bidders at the bottom of the
distribution to take the risk of participating in the auction by submitting a positive
bid. Loss averse bidders prefer certain outcomes. If gain loss utility dominates
intrinsic utility (Λg > 1), then the lowest types have to be compensated for taking
the risk associated with participating in the auction, which translates into the non
negativity constraint on the submitted bid to be binding for these types.
3.1 Revenue Non Equivalence
A well known result from classical auction theory with risk neutral bidders is that the
expected ex ante revenue for the auctioneer is identical, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. As shown
in this subsection, this property fails to hold if bidders are loss averse. The following
propositions summarize the revenue ranking across different auction formats.
Proposition 4 If bidders are loss averse in the money dimension (Λm > 0), the
expected revenue for the auctioneer is strictly increasing in α.
12
Figure 2: APA with Λg = Λm = 2, N = 2, and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
Proof: The expected payment, pα(θ), of a bidder of type, θ, conditional on the other
bidders’ behavior, is
pα(θ) = αbα(θ) + Fθ(1− α)bα(θ),
i.e. αbα with certainty, and (1−α)bα only if he wins, which happens with probability
Fθ. Differentiating the above expression with respect to α yields
∂
∂α
pα(θ) =
Fθ(∆(Fθ)− 1)
(1− α)Fθ∆(Fθ) + αbα(θ),
which is non negative, for all θ and strictly positive, for all θ > θ˜. Since the interim
expected payment is non decreasing for all types and strictly increasing for a set of
types of strictly positive measure, this implies that the ex ante expected revenue for
the auctioneer, N
∫
pα(θ)dF (θ), is strictly increasing in α. 
The following is now an immediate corollary.
Proposition 5 If bidders are loss averse in the money dimension, the expected
revenue for the auctioneer strictly higher in the APA than in the FPA.
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Proof: By proposition 4. 
As seen above, gain loss considerations in the money dimension distort the equilib-
rium bid downwards. By requiring bidders to pay their bid regardless of whether
they win the object or not, gain loss distortions in the money dimension are min-
imized. If α < 1, loss averse bidders realize gains in the money dimension if they
lose, and losses if they win. Since, under loss aversion, losses weigh more than
gains, bidders bid more hesitantly in any auction with α < 1 than in the APA.
Therefore, among all auctions with fixed all pay component, α, the APA maximizes
the auctioneer’s expected revenue. As further elaborated on in the next section, the
all pay nature of a mechanism is an important ingredient in designing the optimal
auction when bidders are loss averse, while any uncertainty in the payments is sub
optimal from a revenue maximizing perspective. Also, as Λm → 0, ∆(Fθ) → 1, so
that revenue equivalence holds in the limit, as loss aversion in the money dimension
vanishes. Loss aversion in the good dimension is irrelevant for the revenue ranking
across auction formats, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If bidders are loss averse in the good dimension and risk neutral in
the money dimension (Λg > 0,Λm = 0), the expected revenue for the auctioneer is
the identical, for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: By proposition 4. 
This result confirms that the revenue ranking across auction format is solely driven
by loss aversion in the money dimension, whereas loss aversion in the good dimension
is responsible for the limited participation results.
3.2 Risk Aversion or Loss Aversion?
A natural question to ask is whether the results derived above are driven by risk
aversion rather than loss aversion. Auctions with risk averse bidders are studied
in Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Matthews (1987),
where bidders’ preferences take the form u(θ,−x), and u is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in both arguments. As a special case of this formulation, which
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is studied in Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006), bidders’ preferences take the form
u(θ−x), where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Fibich, Gavious, and Sela
(2006) compare the expected revenue in the APA and the FPA. Their finding is that
the revenue ranking is ambiguous in the sense that there are utility functions and
distributions for which either the APA or the FPA yields higher expected revenue for
the auctioneer. Maskin and Riley (1984) derive the optimal auction for risk averse
bidders. They find that a perfect insurance auction is optimal with homogeneously
risk averse bidders, who differ only in their type, θ. A perfect insurance auction is
an auction with two payment schemes, one for bidders who win the auction, xW ,
and one for bidders who lose the auction, xL, that depend on the reported type,
but are deterministic otherwise, and have the property that for highest type, the
marginal utility of money is identical in each state, that is
u2(θmax,−xW (θmax)) = u2(0,−xL(θmax)),
or, as studied in Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006),
u′(θmax − xW (θmax)) = u′(−xL(θmax)) =⇒ θmax − xW (θmax) = −xL(θmax).
The APA is nested in the class of perfect insurance auctions, for xW = xL, and
the FPA is nested for xL = 0. The results in Maskin and Riley (1984) imply
that a necessary condition for the APA (xW = xL) to yield the highest expected
revenue for the auctioneer is that the marginal utility of money is independent of
the valuation, θ. Furthermore, the insights obtained by Maskin and Riley (1984)
rationalize the ambiguous revenue ranking between the APA and the FPA reported
in Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006). If bidders’ preferences take the form
u(θ,−x) = θ −m(x),
where m : R+ → R+, is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly convex, and m(0) =
0, the marginal utility of money does not depend on θ, and therefore, the APA yields
the highest expected revenue for the auctioneer, which leads to the following result.
Proposition 7 Suppose bidders are risk averse in the money dimension Then, (i)
the symmetric, strictly increasing equilibrium bidding strategy is given by bRAα (θ) =
15
m−1
(
bRNα (θ)
)
, (ii) the expected revenue for the auctioneer is strictly higher in the
APA than in the FPA, and (iii) every bidder participates in the auction and submits
a positive bid.
Proof: In appendix A.1. 
The intuition behind this result is that risk averse bidders like consumption smooth-
ing in the money dimension. In the FPA, a given increase in the expected payment
is more costly to the bidders than in the APA, and therefore, in expected terms,
they bid more aggressively in the APA. Furthermore, every risk averse bidder with
the above preferences is locally risk neutral. This implies that every risk averse
bidder participates in the auction and submits a positive bid, because he obtains
non negative expected pay off from doing so. As seen above, this is not necessarily
the case if bidders are loss averse. This raises the question whether the limited
participation results derived above for high degrees of loss aversion in the good di-
mension can be explained by first order risk aversion. In order to further study the
effects of risk preferences on equilibrium bidding behavior and the revenue rank-
ing across auction formats, I consider bidders with rank dependent expected utility
(RDEU) preferences as in Yaari (1987). Consider a lottery with monetary outcomes,
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xK which occur with probabilities, p1, p2, . . . , pK , respectively. A
decision maker with RDEU preferences evaluates this lottery according to
U(p, x) =
K∑
k=1
u(xk)
g
 k∑
j=1
pj
− g
k−1∑
j=1
pj
 ,
where g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing probability distortion function, with
g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1. For a suitable choice of g (e.g. g concave), these preferences
generate first order risk aversion at the certainty line. In order to focus on first order
risk aversion, I assume that u(θ,−x) = θ − x and that g is strictly concave. This
leads to the following result regarding the revenue ranking across auction formats
when bidders have RDEU preferences.
Proposition 8 Suppose bidders have RDEU preferences of the form specified above,
with g concave. Then, (i) the symmetric, strictly increasing equilibrium bidding
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function, bRDEUα , is given by
bRDEUα (θ) =
g (Fθ) θ −
∫ θ
θmin
g (Fs) ds
(1− α)g (Fθ) + α ,
(ii) the expected revenue for the auctioneer is strictly higher in the APA than in the
FPA, and (iii) every bidder participates in the auction and submits a positive bid.
Proof: In appendix A.1. 
The utility in case of winning the auction is θ − bRDEUα (θ), and the utility in the
event of losing is −bRDEUα (θ). Since θ ≥ bRDEUα (θ) ≥ 0, the decision maker only
considers lotteries on one side of the certainty line. Therefore, the reason for the APA
yielding higher expected revenue for the auctioneer than the FPA does not follow
an insurance argument. Instead, the above result is driven by bidders overweighting
the probability of winning, since the assumptions on g imply that g(Fθ) ≥ Fθ,
for all θ. This implies that a bidder with RDEU preferences is overoptimistic or
overconfident of winning the auction. To see why this leads to revenue ranking
across auction formats, consider the interim expected pay off of a bidder of type θ,
V RDEUα (θ) = g(Fθ)
(
θ − (1− α)bRDEUα (θ)
)− αbRDEUα (θ).
Since g(Fθ) ≥ Fθ, a bidder with RDEU preferences attaches a too high probability
to winning the auction, in which case he has to pay the remaining (1 − α) of his
bid. If α = 1, the bidder has to pay his bid with certainty, and therefore, there
is no room for overweighting probabilities (since g(1) = 1). Also, as in the case
of ordinary risk aversion, every bidder with RDEU preferences participates in the
auction and submits a positive bid. These results suggest that the revenue ranking
across auction formats is also obtained with second order risk aversion and RDEU
preferences with probability overweighting, in conjunction with strong separability
of the Bernoulli utility function in the good and in the money dimension. Figure 3
illustrates the bidding behavior when bidders are risk averse and risk loving, first
and second order.
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Figure 3: N = 2, gRA(x) =
√
x, gRL(x) = x2, m(x) = xγ , γRL = 4/5, γRA = 5/4,
and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
4 The Optimal Auction
In the preceding analysis, only a restricted class of sales mechanisms has been con-
sidered. In the spirit of Myerson (1981), I now investigate what sales mechanism the
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auctioneer optimally announces when he can choose freely. Before turning to the
derivation of the optimal auction, some tools from the theory of mechanism design
with risk neutral agents are needed3.
4.1 Mechanism Design with Loss Averse Agents
Definition 3 A mechanism, M, consists of a collection of allowable strategies, Si,
for each agent i and an outcome function, G : ×Ni=1Si → A, where A is the set of
alternatives.
Together with the description of priors, pay offs, and the type space, ×Ni=1Θ, a
mechanism, M, describes a Bayesian game, in which a strategy for agent i is a
mapping, σi : Θ→ Si.
Definition 4 A social choice function, F , is a mapping from the type space to the
set of alternatives, F : ×Ni=1Θ→ A.
Definition 5 A mechanism, M, implements F in CPE if there is a CPE strategy
profile, {σi}Ni=1, of the game induced by M, such that
G (σ1(θ1), . . . , σN (θN )) = F(θ1, . . . , θN ),
for all (θ1, . . . , θN ) ∈ ×Ni=1Θ.
Definition 6 A direct mechanism, MD, is a mechanism in which Si = Θ, for all
i.
Definition 7 A social choice function, F , is CPE incentive compatible (CPEIC) if
the strategy, σi(θi) = θi, is a CPE strategy in the direct mechanism, MD = {·,G =
F}, for all i, θi.
3Apart from Myerson (1981), the following discussion draws primarily from Krishna (2009),
ch. 5, as well as material taught in lectures by Jeffrey Ely, Ron Siegel, Rakesh Vohra, and Asher
Wolinsky, whom I thank for this.
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Using the above definitions, the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 9 (Revelation Principle for CPE) There is a mechanism imple-
menting social choice function, F , in CPE if and only if it is CPEIC.
Proof: For sufficiency, choose the direct mechanism. In order to show necessity,
suppose that there is a mechanism, M = {S1, . . . , SN ,G}, that implements F in
CPE and let HGi (A|σi, σ−i) be the distribution over A when agent i plays according
to σi, the rules of the mechanism are given by G, and all other agents play according
to σ−i. If {σi(θi)}Ni=1 is part of a CPE, then for all i, σ′ ∈ Si, θi,
U
(
HGi (A|σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i))|HGi (A|σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i)), θi
)
≥ U (HGi (A|σ′, σ−i(θ−i))|HGi (A|σ′, σ−i(θ−i)), θi) .
In particular, this is true for σ′ = σi(θˆi), for all i, θˆi. Therefore, if {σi(θi)}Ni=1 is part
of a CPE, then for all i, θi, θˆi,
U
(
HGi (A|σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i))|HGi (A|σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i)), θi
)
≥ U
(
HGi (A|σi(θˆi), σ−i(θ−i))|HGi (A|σi(θˆi), σ−i(θ−i)), θi
)
.
Since G(σ1(θ1), . . . , σN (θN )) = F(θ1, . . . , θN ), HFi (A|θi, θ−i) = HGi (A|σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i))),
for all i, θi. This implies that for all i, θi, θˆi,
U
(
HFi (A|θi, θ−i)|HFi (A|θi, θ−i), θi
) ≥ U (HFi (A|θˆi, θ−i)|HFi (A|θˆi, θ−i), θi) .

As usual, this result implies that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to direct mechanisms. Consider a direct mechanism and suppose that Qi(θi, θ−i) ∈
{0, 1} is the ex post allocation4 to agent i when he is of type θi. The interim expected
allocation to agent i is thus
qi(θi) :=
∫
{θ−i}
Qi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi).
4For simplicity, I assume that the object is indivisible, so that ex post, the auctioneer either
gives the object to an agent or not. Allowing the auctioneer to allocate the object to a bidder with
some probability would only complicate matters, and ultimately lead to the same result.
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Let Ti(θi, θ−i) be agent i’s ex post payment to the mechanism when his report is
θi, and the vector of his opponents’ reports is θ−i. Then, the ex post (after the
realization of θ−i) indirect utility of an agent with type θi in this mechanism is
(Qi(θi, θ−i) + ηgQi(θi, θ−i)(1− qi(θi))− ηgλg(1−Qi(θi, θ−i))qi(θi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Bi(θi,θ−i)
θi
−Ti(θi, θ−i)− Ωi(θi, θ−i),
where
Ωi(θi, θ−i) := ηmλm
∫
{θ′−i:Ti(θi,θ′−i)<Ti(θi,θ−i)}
(
Ti(θi, θ−i)− Ti(θi, θ′−i)
)
dF (θ′−i|θi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
losses
− ηm
∫
{θ′−i:Ti(θi,θ′−i)>Ti(θi,θ−i)}
(
Ti(θi, θ′−i)− Ti(θi, θ−i)
)
dF (θ′−i|θi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gains
.
Letting Bi(θi, θ−i) be the perceived ex post allocation rule and Ti(θi, θ−i) := Ti(θi, θ−i)+
Ωi(θi, θ−i) be the perceived ex post payment to the mechanism, the ex post indirect
utility of agent i with type θi in a CPEIC mechanism can be written as
Vi(θi|θi, θ−i) = Bi(θi, θ−i)θi − Ti(θi, θ−i),
which is of the same form as the ex post indirect utility of a risk neutral agent in a
Bayesian Nash IC mechanism. The interim expected utility of an agent of type θi
reporting to be type θˆi is
Vi(θˆi|θi) = βi(θˆi)θi − τi(θˆi),
where5
τi(θˆi) :=
∫
{θ−i}
Ti(θˆi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi)
and
βi(θˆi) :=
∫
{θ−i}
Bi(θˆi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi) = qi(θˆi)(1− Λg(1− qi(θˆi))).
5Here, I make use of the independence assumption.
21
By the revelation principle, the social choice function, F(θ1, . . . , θN ) = ({Qi}Ni=1,
{Ti}Ni=1) is CPEIC if and only if
Vi(θi|θi) = βi(θi)θi − τi(θi) ≥ βi(θˆi)θi − τi(θˆi) = Vi(θˆi|θi), (CPEIC)
for all i, θi, θˆi. These considerations taken together imply an analogue of the char-
acterization result for Bayesian Nash incentive compatibility for risk neutral agents,
as well as a version of the revenue equivalence theorem for perceived payments in all
CPEIC mechanisms. All results from the theory of mechanism design with risk neu-
tral agents apply to this setting with loss averse agents to the perceived allocation
rule and the perceived payments, so that the following propositions hold.
Proposition 10 (Characterization of CPEIC) (i) Let βi : [θmin, θmax]→ [−(Λg−
1)2/ (4λg), 1]. Then, there exist functions, τi : [θmin, θmax]→ R, such that ({βi}Ni=1,
{τi}Ni=1) satisfy (CPEIC) if and only if βi is non decreasing, for all i, θi. (ii) If
({βi}Ni=1, {τi}Ni=1) satisfy (CPEIC), then
Vi(θi|θi) = Vi(θmin|θmin) +
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds
and
τi(θi) = βi(θi)θi − Vi(θmin|θmin)−
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds.
Proof: If Λg ≤ 1, condition 1 is satisfied, and βi(θ) ∈ [0, 1], for all qi(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. If
Λg > 1, then βi is a convex function of qi, minimized at q∗ = (Λg−1)/(2Λg) ∈ (0, 1)
with
β∗ := min
q∈[0,1]
{q(1− Λg(1− q))} = −(Λ
g − 1)2
4Λg
< 0.
CPEIC requires that for all i, θi, θˆi,
Vi(θi|θi) ≥ Vi(θˆi|θi) = βi(θˆi)θi − τi(θˆi) = Vi(θˆi|θˆi) + βi(θˆi)(θi − θˆi).
Reversing the roles of θi and θˆi,
Vi(θˆi|θˆi) ≥ Vi(θi|θi) + βi(θi)(θˆi − θi).
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Without loss of generality, assume that θi ≥ θˆi. Then, the above two inequalities
combined imply that
βi(θˆi) ≤ Vi(θi|θi)− Vi(θˆi|θˆi)
θi − θˆi
≤ βi(θi).
Therefore, βi has to be monotone in the reported type, proving necessity in (i).
Taking the limit as θi → θˆi shows that
∂
∂θi
Vi(θi|θi) = βi(θi),
so that
Vi(θi|θi) = Vi(θmin|θmin) +
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds.
Also,
Vi(θi|θi) = βi(θi)θi − τi(θi).
The last two equations combined imply that
τi(θi) = βi(θi)θi − Vi(θmin|θmin)−
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds,
which proves (ii). For sufficiency in (i), suppose that βi is non decreasing and let
τi(θi) = βi(θi)θi −
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds.
This implies that
Vi(θi|θi) =
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds.
Since θi ≥ θˆi,
Vi(θi|θi)− Vi(θˆi|θˆi) =
∫ θi
θˆi
βi(s)ds ≥ βi(θˆi)(θi − θˆi),
where the ultimate inequality follows from monotonicity of βi. Together with the
definition of τi, this yields
Vi(θi|θi) ≥ βi(θˆi)θi −
(
βi(θˆi)θˆi − Vi(θˆi|θˆi)
)
= βi(θˆi)θi − τi(θˆi) = Vi(θˆi|θi),
so the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied, for all i, θi, θˆi. 
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Proposition 11 (Perceived Revenue Equivalence) If ({βi}Ni=1, {τi}Ni=1) and
({βi}Ni=1, {τ˜i}Ni=1) satisfy (CPEIC), then, τi(θi) − τ˜i(θi) = hi, for some number,
hi, for all i, θi.
Proof: By proposition 10, since τ and τ˜ implement the perceived allocation rule, βi,
in CPEIC, they can only be different through Vi and V˜i. Hence, hi = V˜i(θmin|θmin)−
Vi(θmin|θmin). 
The expected physical payment to the mechanism of an agent of type θi is
ti(θi) := τi(θi)− ωi(θi),
where
ωi(θi) :=
∫
{θ−i}
Ωi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi).
For the remaining discussion, it is useful to define the following concept.
Definition 8 An ex post CPEIC payment schedule, {Ti}Ni=1 is said to satisfy the 0
probability property (0PP) if it satisfies the following.
∃i, θi : ∃θ1, θ2 : Ti(θi, θ1) 6= Ti(θi, θ2)
=⇒ P (θ−i ∈ {θ′ : Ti(θi, θ′) 6= Ti(θi, θ1)}) = 0 or
P
(
θ−i ∈ {θ′ : Ti(θi, θ′) 6= Ti(θi, θ2)}
)
= 0.
In words, if there are at least two different ex post payments, then they may only
be different with probability 0, from an interim perspective. Using this definition,
the following lemma can be stated.
Lemma 1 ωi(θi) ≥ 0, for all i, θi. If payments to the mechanism are non degenerate
and do not satisfy the 0PP, the inequality holds strict.
Proof: By definition of Ωi and ωi,
ωi(θi) =
∫
{θ−i}
Ωi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi)
= ηmλm
∫
{θ−i}
∫
{θ′−i:Ti(θi,θ′−i)<Ti(θi,θ−i)}
(
Ti(θi, θ−i)− Ti(θi, θ′−i)
)
dF (θ′−i|θi)dF (θ−i|θi)
−ηm
∫
{θ−i}
∫
{θ′−i:Ti(θi,θ′−i)>Ti(θi,θ−i)}
(
Ti(θi, θ′−i)− Ti(θi, θ−i)
)
dF (θ′−i|θi)dF (θ−i|θi).
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Consider the range of integration of the inner integral in the penultimate line of
the above expression. For every θ1 ∈ {θ′−i : Ti(θi, θ′−i) < Ti(θi, θ−i)}, there is a
θ2 ∈ {θ−i : ∃θ′−i : Ti(θi, θ′−i) > Ti(θi, θ−i)} with θ1 = θ2. In words, comparing the
current state to a better state implies that when the better state occurs, comparing
it to the current state is considered a loss. This implies that ωi can be rewritten as
ωi(θi) = Λm
∫
{θ−i}
∫
{θ′−i:Ti(θi,θ′−i)<Ti(θi,θ−i)}
(
Ti(θi, θ−i)− Ti(θi, θ′−i)
)
dF (θ′−i|θi)dF (θ−i|θi).
The range of integration implies that the inner integrand is strictly positive if the
transfer payments to the mechanism are non degenerate as a function of θ−i. If,
in addition, the non degenerate transfer payments do not satisfy the 0PP, also the
outer integrand is strictly positive, which implies that ωi(θi) > 0, for all i, θi. If
payments are deterministic or satisfy the 0PP, then ωi(θi) = 0, for all i, θi. 
For a given perceived allocation and payment rule, the mechanism designer can
choose functions ti and ωi, so long as for all i, θi, their sum is exactly τi(θi). Since
the expected physical payment of an agent with type θi is strictly decreasing in
ωi, for all θi, the physical payments to the mechanism are maximized when setting
ωi(θi) = 0, for all i, θi. This translates into having no uncertainty (except, possibly,
at probability 0 events) in the payments. Furthermore, this implies revenue equiva-
lence for the physical payments among all CPEIC mechanisms that have perceived
allocation rule βi, deterministic payments, or payments satisfying the 0PP.
4.2 The Auctioneer’s Problem
Consider now the optimization problem of the auctioneer. When designing the
optimal mechanism, he has to ensure that the agents participate in the mechanism,
and do not prefer to get their outside option instead, which is normalized to 0.
Therefore, the individual rationality (IR) constraints are given by
Vi(θi|θi) = βi(θi)θi − τi(θi) ≥ 0, (IR)
for all i, θi. In the absence of opportunity and production costs, the auctioneer’s
program is
max{βi,qi,ti,ωi,Qi,Vi}Ni=1
{
N∑
i=1
∫ θmax
θmin
ti(θi)f(θi)dθi
}
(P1)
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subject to (CPEIC),
(IR),
ωi(θi) ≥ 0,
qi(θi) =
∫
{θ−i}
Qi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi),
βi(θi) = qi(θi) (1− Λg(1− qi(θi))) ,
Qi(θi, θ−i) ∈ {0, 1},
N∑
i=1
Qi(θi, θ−i) ≤ 1, for all i, θi, θ−i.
That is, he seeks to maximize the sum of ex ante expected physical payments to the
mechanism, subject to the various feasibility constraints. Using the characterization
result in proposition 10 and substituting for ti(θi), (P1) can be written as
max{βi,qi,ωi,Qi,Vi}Ni=1
{
N∑
i=1
∫ θmax
θmin
(βi(θi)θi − ωi(θi)− Vi(θmin|θmin) (P2)
−
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds
)
f(θi)dθi
}
subject to Monotonicity of βi
(IR),
ωi(θi) ≥ 0,
qi(θi) =
∫
{θ−i}
Qi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi),
βi(θi) = qi(θi) (1− Λg(1− qi(θi))) ,
Qi(θi, θ−i) ∈ {0, 1},
N∑
i=1
Qi(θi, θ−i) ≤ 1, for all i, θi, θ−i.
By lemma 1, ωi(θi) ≥ 0, for all i, θi, which enters with a negative sign in the
auctioneer’s objective, for all i. Besides there, it only appears in the IR constraints.
Lowering ωi(θi), for all i, θi, relaxes the IR constraints and increases the value of
the objective. Therefore, the auctioneer will optimally choose ωi(θi) = 0, for all
i, θi. He can do this in two different ways. First, he can offer a payment schedule
with deterministic payments as a function of the reported type. Second, he can
offer payments that depend also on the report of the other agents, but in this case,
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each but one value in the support of payments of the so induced distribution may
only occur with probability 0, from an interim perspective. Using these insights and
integration by parts, (P2) can be written as
max{βi,qi,Qi,Vi}Ni=1

N∑
i=1
∫ θmax
θmin
βi(θi)
(
θi − 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ν(θi)
f(θi)dθi (P3)
−
N∑
i=1
Vi(θmin|θmin)
}
subject to Monotonicity of βi,
(IR),
qi(θi) =
∫
{θ−i}
Qi(θi, θ−i)dF (θ−i|θi),
βi(θi) = qi(θi) (1− Λg(1− qi(θi))) ,
Qi(θi, θ−i) ∈ {0, 1},
N∑
i=1
Qi(θi, θ−i) ≤ 1, for all i, θi, θ−i.
The expression in the objective is identical to the one obtained in Myerson (1981),
except βi is replaced by qi. As the analysis in Myerson (1981) suggests, it is a useful
step in finding the optimal mechanism to consider the point wise maximization of the
expression in the integrand while dropping the monotonicity constraint and making
the following technical assumption.
Assumption 1 (Regularity) ν is strictly increasing in θi, for all θi.
Define θ∗∗ := max{θ˜, θ∗}, where ν(θ∗) = 0, and θ˜ is the same as in proposition
3. If condition 1 is satisfied (Λg ≤ 1), βi ≥ 0, for all i, qi ∈ [0, 1], so that, as in
the original analysis of Myerson (1981) with risk neutral agents, θ˜ = θmin and, by
implication, θ∗∗ = θ∗. In this case, an optimal auction gives the object to the bidder
with the highest type, provided that it is at least θ∗. Suppose now that condition 1
is violated (Λg > 1). In this case, the auctioneer maximizes the objective in (P3), by
setting βi(θi) = β∗ < 0, for all i, θi < θ∗ with v(θi) < 0. However, the IR constraints
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require that
Vi(θi|θi) = Vi(θmin|θmin) +
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds ≥ 0 =⇒ Vi(θmin|θmin) ≥ −
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds,
for all i, θi < θ∗. Part (ii) of proposition 10 implies that
ti(θi) = βi(θi)θi −
∫ θi
θmin
βi(s)ds− Vi(θmin|θmin) ≤ βi(θi)θi < 0.
Clearly, this is not revenue maximizing, since the auctioneer can strictly improve by
ex ante committing to set βi(θi) = 0, for all i, θi < θ∗. Furthermore, for θi ≥ θ∗∗,
he wants to give the object to the bidder with the highest type. Another distinction
has to be made whether θ∗∗ = θ˜ or θ∗∗ = θ∗. Suppose first that θ˜ < θ∗. In this
case, the result in Myerson (1981) applies. Since ν(θi) < 0, for all θi < θ∗, it is
never ex ante optimal for the auctioneer to give the object to a bidder with θi < θ∗.
Suppose now that θ˜ > θ∗ and suppose that the auctioneer ex ante commits to give
the object to a bidder with θ˜ > θi > θ∗. By proposition 10, for all i, θi, in any
optimal mechanism, such an agent’s interim expected utility is
Vi(θi|θi) = Vi(θmin|θmin) +
∫ θi
θ∗
βi(s)ds = Vi(θmin|θmin) +
∫ θi
θ∗
Γ(s)ds.
Since Γ(θi) < 0, for all i, θi < θ˜, the IR and IC constraints imply that ti(θi) < 0, for
these types. Again, this is not revenue maximizing for the auctioneer, because he can
strictly improve by ex ante committing to not allocate the object to any bidder with
θi < θ˜. Additionally, Vi(θmin|θmin) enters with a negative sign in the auctioneer’s
objective, and appears only in the IR constraint of the lowest type. This is because
monotonicity of βi together with the fact that βi < 0 is never optimal for the
auctioneer implies that if the IR constraint is satisfied for θmin, then it is satisfied
for all i, θi ≥ θmin. Therefore, the auctioneer optimally sets Vi(θmin|θmin) = 0,
for all i. Consequently, an optimal mechanism gives the object to highest type,
provided that is at least θ∗∗ = max{θ˜, θ∗}. This rule satisfies monotonicity of βi,
for all i. Hence, the relaxed problem yields the same value of the objective as the
constrained problem. Since the value of the objective in the constrained problem is
bounded above by its value in the relaxed problem, this rule is revenue maximizing.
Therefore, an optimal auction gives the object to the bidder with highest type, has
deterministic payments or non degenerate payments only if they satisfy the 0PP,
28
and never gives the object to a bidder with θ < θ∗∗. The above analysis readily
extends to situations in which the auctioneer has multiple units of the same object
to sell, and each bidder only wants one of them. In this case, the optimal auction
gives the K ≥ 1 available objects to the bidders with the K highest values, provided
they are at least θ∗∗.
4.3 Implementing an Optimal Auction
The auctioneer can design an APA with minimum bid as an indirect revenue maxi-
mizing mechanism. The minimum bid needs to be chosen so that it is never optimal
for a bidder with θ < θ∗∗ to participate in the auction. Suppose the auctioneer has
set the minimum bid, bmin, such that only bidders with θ ≥ θ∗∗ participate in the
auction. Then, using the equilibrium bidding function derived above, for θ ≥ θ∗∗,
b1(θ) = Γ(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ∗∗
Γ(s)ds.
This gives b1(θ∗∗) = Γ(θ∗∗)θ∗∗. Suppose the auctioneer chooses bmin = Γ(θ∗∗)θ∗∗
as the minimum bid. Then, any bidder with θ < θ∗∗ receives strictly negative
interim expected pay off from submitting a bid of bmin or above, a bidder with
type θ∗∗ receives interim expected utility of exactly 0, and any bidder with θ > θ∗∗
earns strictly positive interim expected utility from submitting a bid above bmin.
Therefore, setting bmin = Γ(θ∗∗)θ∗∗ achieves the revenue maximizing goal of the
auctioneer. If θ∗ > θ˜, bmin is strictly decreasing in Λg, so that the participation
threshold is reduced in the revenue maximizing mechanism; if θ˜ > θ∗, bmin = 0.
As argued above, risk averse bidders are locally risk neutral and therefore, the
optimal minimum bid is positive. Even in the case of RDEU preferences, the optimal
minimum bid is never 0. The following proposition summarizes the optimal sales
mechanism.
Proposition 12 Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then, in an optimal mechanism, the
auctioneer allocates the object to the bidder with the highest report, provided that it
is at least θ∗∗ = max{θ˜, θ∗}. Payments can only depend on the other bidders’ type
in a non degenerate way if the 0PP holds. An optimal indirect mechanism can be
constructed by announcing an APA with minimum bid, bmin = Γ(θ∗∗)θ∗∗.
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Proof: In text. 
The striking insight is that any revenue maximizing mechanism is of the all pay
nature. The reason is that the interim pay off of an agent of type θi is the same across
all CPEIC mechanisms but the physical payment is not. By introducing uncertainty
in the ex post payments to the mechanism, the auctioneer only lowers the amount he
can extract from the agents. In a mechanism with a binary ex post payment schedule
based on the reported type as in the FPA, if a bidder wins the auction, he compares
this probabilistically to the situation in which he looses the auction and considers
the bid paid a loss. If he looses the auction, he compares this probabilistically to
the cases in which he wins the auction and considers the bid saved as a gain. Since
bidders like gains less than they dislike losses, the overall effect on the interim pay
off is negative. A similar argument proves the sub optimality of the Vickrey auction.
Lange and Ratan (2010) show that the expected revenue in the FPA is higher than
in the Vickrey auction. This insight can be obtained in the framework of the above
analysis by comparing the values of ωi in the two auction formats. If a bidder in
the Vickrey auction wins the auction, he does not only have gain loss considerations
in the money dimension due to payments conditional on winning, but also due to
the fact that what he pays depends on what the opponents have reported. This
leads to additional distortions, resulting in lower revenue for the auctioneer. By
offering all pay mechanisms, the auctioneer can shut these effects down and extract
the surplus generated through this. Consequently, all pay mechanisms dominate all
mechanisms with, from an interim view, uncertain ex post payments. Additionally,
not every optimal mechanism is efficient in the classical sense, i.e. if maxi{θi} < θ∗∗,
the auctioneer keeps the object. When determining the optimal minimum bid, the
auctioneer trades off two effects. If he increases the minimum bid, he increases the
risk of not selling the object at all. However, in the cases that he still sells the object,
he sells it at a higher price, because a higher minimum bid induces bidders to bid
more aggressively. The optimal minimum bid is chosen such that these two effects
exactly outweigh each other. The following example illustrates the construction of
an optimal indirect mechanism.
Example 1 Suppose that N = 2 and θ ∼ U [0, 1]. In this case, θ−(1−F (θ))/f(θ) =
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2θ − 1 and θ∗ = 1/2. Figure 4 shows the equilibrium bidding function in the APA
with minimum bid, as an indirect optimal mechanism, for the cases Λg1 = 1, Λ
g
2 = 2
(i.e. θ∗∗ = θ˜ = θ∗ = 1/2), and risk neutrality (Λg = 0).
Figure 4: All Pay Bids in an Optimal Auction for Λg1 = 1, Λ
g
2 = 2, N = 2, and
θ ∼ U [0, 1].
4.4 Legal Constraints
In some legal systems, the above described optimal auction format with α = 1
and a minimum bid of bmin = Γ(θ∗∗)θ∗∗ may not be implementable, since it is
considered a form of gambling. However, the auctioneer can always circumvent
this constraint by announcing the following mechanism. Bidders are told that the
mechanism is an FPA with a suitably chosen minimum bid, so that no bidder with
θ < θ∗∗ participates. Each bidder writes his bid on a piece of paper and submits it
to the auctioneer. Assuming the bidders play a symmetric, strictly increasing CPE
strategy, the bids submitted are generated according to b0(θ). In doing this, bidders
essentially reveal their type to the auctioneer, who can then offer them insurance of
the following form. They are offered to pay b1(θ) = b0(θ)Fθ∆(Fθ), and save their
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bid, b0(θ), in case they win the auction. According to the above analysis, bidders are
indifferent between accepting the insurance or not, since it leads to the same interim
expected pay off. Assuming this indifference is broken in favor of the insurance, this
auction format is also optimal.
5 Related Literature
The present paper and the results derived above are related to three areas of eco-
nomic research: auction theory and mechanism design, experimental work in eco-
nomics, and behavioral IO. The connection to each of these is established separately.
5.1 Auction Theory and Mechanism Design
To a large extent, classical theory of auctions and mechanism design is governed
by the paradigm of risk neutral agents. Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and
Riley (1984) and Matthews (1987) study the implications of risk averse bidders in
auction settings. Lange and Ratan (2010) extend this body of economic research
to the case of loss averse bidders and show that the FPA yields higher expected
revenue than the Vickrey auction. Shunda (2008) shows that under a different
notion of reference dependence, the auctioneer can increase his expected revenue by
introducing a buy now price. Nakajima (2010) considers bidders with preferences
allowing for the Allais Paradox and finds that the Dutch auction generates higher
expected revenue for the auctioneer than the FPA. In the present paper, I focus in
particular on all pay mechanisms and provide a generalization the work of Lange
and Ratan (2010). Furthermore, all results derived above for loss averse agents are
a generalization of the existing theory of risk neutral agents, since the well known
results with risk neutral agents obtain in the limit, as loss aversion vanishes. In
the theoretical literature on auctions, the same revenue ranking between the FPA
and the APA has been proven for the case of affiliated values (Amann (1995)) and
common value auctions with budget constrained bidders (Che and Gale (1996)).
Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1984) consider optimal auctions
with risk averse bidders. The general insight obtained is that the expected revenue
is higher in the FPA than in the Vickrey auction, a result also obtained by Lange
and Ratan (2010) in the case of loss averse bidders. Maskin and Riley (1984) derive
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the optimal auction for a wide range of preferences exhibiting risk aversion. In their
analysis, the optimal auction is a perfect insurance auction, which is an auction in
which the marginal utility of the highest type is equated across states.
5.2 Experimental Work in Economics
The results derived above have sharp testable implications. This involves testing
attitudes towards decisions under risk such as risk aversion, risk lovingness, loss
aversion, as well as the theory of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007). As part of the existing
experimental literature on auctions, Schramm and Onderstal (2008) bring empirical
proof for the failure of revenue equivalence across different auction formats and the
departure from risk neutral equilibrium bidding in controlled IPV settings. They
report that for the APA, most types overbid compared to the risk neutral equilibrium
bid, while there are some types that underbid. Schramm and Onderstal (2008)
also find that the lowest types do not participate and submit a bid of 0. Their
empirical findings for the FPA suggest that all types underbid compared to the
risk neutral case. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) study the FPA and propose a
theory of winner and looser regret to support their experimental findings. A more
philosophical question is whether empirical findings depart from the predictions of
classical theory because of non standard attitudes towards decisions under risk or
because decision makers outside economic models are simply not capable of playing
equilibrium strategies. However, the present paper provides an alternative approach
of studying the matter and a partial explanation for laboratory evidence.
5.3 Behavioral IO
Recently, increased interest of the profession in models of non standard preferences
and non standard decision making has led to the development of models of how a
firm or a principal provides the optimal contract to agents which are e.g. loss averse
(Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008), Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010)), time in-
consistent (Eliaz and Spiegler (2009), Yilmaz (2009), Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2010)),
or overconfident (Grubb (2009)). The present paper provides a general framework
for analyzing mechanisms with loss averse agents, with applications to contracting,
allocation problems, etc. Of the existing work, the present paper is most closely
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related to the recent work of Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010), who study an
agency relationship with moral hazard in which the principal is risk neutral and the
agent is loss averse in the sense of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007). The main finding is
that a binary payment schedule is the optimal contract offered by the principal. The
intuition behind this is similar to the one provided above. Uncertainty in the money
dimension only causes inefficiencies when agents are loss averse. They receive iden-
tical interim pay offs across all CPEIC mechanisms. Because of the moral hazard
problem, the principal in Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010) is constrained to
offer at least some performance pay component as part of the optimal contract. In
their framework, this translates into offering a binary payment scheme with a jump
only where it matters most for the principal. Related is also the main finding of
Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008). They show that, under certain conditions, imperfect
competition of firms in a differentiated product industry facing loss averse consumers
induces a pricing equilibrium in which all firms charge the same price, despite the
fact that they may face different distributions of production costs. Taken these and
the above findings together, loss aversion appears like uncertainty aversion, at least
from a theoretical point of view.
6 Limitations
The above results rely on strong separability of preferences in the good and in the
money dimension and the solution concept used. Strong separability is used exten-
sively in the literature on the theory of auctions. The choice of the solution concept
has been justified above. In appendix A.2, the piece wise linear specification of the
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function is relaxed to allow for diminishing
sensitivity in gains and losses. The revenue ranking across auction formats con-
tinues to hold in this case. A shortcoming of the theory is the assumption that
bidders are homogeneous with respect to their degree loss aversion (Λl, l ∈ {g,m} is
the same across bidders) and that this is common knowledge among the auctioneer
and all bidders. Possible extensions of the theory presented may try to relax this
assumption in the light of mechanism design with multi dimensional types.
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7 Conclusion
The results derived above have sharp implications testable in the laboratory and in
the field. The theory developed above raises new questions in experimental work and
may provide a theoretical foundation for bidding behavior observed in experiments.
If bidders are loss averse, all pay mechanisms dominate any other form of sales
mechanism, from a revenue maximizing view. In reality, however, actual all pay
mechanism for allocation purposes are rare. Auctions for charitable purposes are
sometimes characterized by all pay components. Recently, some on line auctioneers
have implemented auctions with significant all pay components, in which each bidder
has to pay a fee for raising the current bid by a fixed increment. This mechanism
has the flavor of an APA with a minimum bid of essentially 0. For most sales
mechanisms however, auction formats with payments conditional on winning (FPA,
Vickrey auction) are much more common. As shown above, the APA yields the
highest expected revenue for the auctioneer under a wide range of risk attitudes, yet
loss aversion is the only one of the above for which an APA with a minimum bid of
0 can be optimal.
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A Appendix
A.1 Omitted Proofs:
Proof of second order risk aversion: A bidder of type θ solves
Vˆα(θ) := max
x∈R+
{P (x)(θ −m ((1− α)x))−m(αx)}
= Fθ
(
θ −m ((1− α)bRAα (θ)))−m (αbRAα (θ)) .
Application of the envelope theorem shows that bRAα is the solution to the following
equation. ∫ θ
θmin
Fsds+m
(
αbRAα (θ)
)
= Fθ
(
θ −m ((1− α)bRAα (θ))) .
Using the fact that m is monotone, the equilibrium bidding functions in the FPA
(α = 0) and the APA (α = 1) are given by
bRA0 (θ) = m
−1
(
θ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds
Fθ
)
= m−1
(
bRN0 (θ)
)
and
bRA1 (θ) = m
−1
(
Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds
)
= m−1
(
bRN1 (θ)
)
.
The expected payment of a bidder of type θ in the two auction formats are given by
pRA0 (θ) = Fθm
−1
(
θ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds
Fθ
)
= Fθm−1
(
bRN0 (θ)
)
and
pRA1 (θ) = m
−1
(
Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds
)
= m−1
(
bRN1 (θ)
)
= m−1
(
Fθb
RN
0 (θ)
)
.
Since m is strictly increasing and strictly convex, m−1 is strictly increasing and
strictly concave. By definition of m, m−1(0) = 0. Comparing the two expected
payments,
pRA0 (θ) ≤ pRA1 (θ)
⇐⇒ Fθm−1
(
bRN0 (θ)
)
+ (1− Fθ)m−1(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ m−1 (bRN0 (θ))+m−1((1− Fθ)0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
,
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which is always true, since m−1 is strictly concave. Also, the inequality holds strict
on a set of measure one. 
Proof of first order risk aversion: A bidder with RDEU preferences of type θ solves
V (θ) = max
x∈R+
{g (P (x)) (θ − (1− α)x)− αx}
= g (Fθ)
(
θ − (1− α)bRDEUα (θ)
)− αbRDEUα (θ).
By the envelope theorem,
bRDEUα (θ) =
g (Fθ) θ −
∫ θ
θmin
g (Fs) ds
(1− α)g (Fθ) + α .
The expected payment of a bidder of type θ in auction α is given by
pα(θ) = (α+ Fθ(1− α)) bα(θ).
Differentiating with respect to α yields
∂
∂α
pα(θ) =
[
(g (Fθ)− 1) Fθ(1− α) + α
g (Fθ) (1− α) + α + (1− Fθ)
]
bα(θ).
Since bα(θ) ≥ 0, for all θm the above expression is non negative if and only if
1− Fθ ≥ (1− g (Fθ)) Fθ(1− α) + α
g (Fθ) (1− α) + α.
A concave g will make the above inequality true because g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, and g
concave imply that g (Fθ) ≥ Fθ. 
A.2 Diminishing Sensitivity
For the value function, I now assume that
µ˜g(x) :=
{
d(x), if x ≥ 0
−λgd(−x), if x < 0,
where d : R+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, non convex, and d(0) = 0.
Hence, a bidder of type θ solves
Vα(θ) = max
x∈R+
{P (x) (θ − x− λgηg (1− P (x)) d ((1− α)x))
+ (1− P (x)) (−αx+ ηgP (x)g ((1− α)x))}
= Fθθ − ((1− α)Fθ + α) bα(θ)− Λg(1− Fθ)Fθd ((1− α)bα(θ)) .
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By the envelope theorem, the equilibrium bidding function is the solution to the
following equation
bα(θ) =
Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds− Λg(1− Fθ)Fθd ((1− α)bα(θ))
(1− α)Fθ + α .
For the FPA (α = 0) and the APA (α = 1), this reads
b0(θ) =
Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds− Λg(1− Fθ)Fθd (b0(θ))
Fθ
and
b1(θ) = Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds.
The interim expected payment of a bidder of type θ, in auction α, pα, is given by
p0(θ) = Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds− Λg(1− Fθ)Fθd (b0(θ))
and
p1(θ) = Fθθ −
∫ θ
θmin
Fsds
= p0(θ) + Λg(1− Fθ)Fθd (b0(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
,
which implies that p1(θ)[>] ≥ p0(θ), for [almost] all θ, so that the ex ante expected
revenue for the auctioneer is strictly higher in the APA than in the FPA.
A.3 Strictly Increasing Differences
Lemma 2 Suppose condition 1 is satisfied. Then, Fθ (1− Λg(1− Fθ)) is strictly
increasing in θ.
Proof: Differentiating the above expression with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
{Fθ (1− Λg(1− Fθ))} > 0
⇐⇒ 1− Λg > −2ΛgFθ.
If the above condition does not hold, then
1− Λg ≤ −2ΛgFθ,
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for some θ. Since Λg > 0, the RHS of this inequality is strictly negative, for θ ∈
(θmin, θmax]. Therefore, for the above inequality to hold, it has to also be that the
LHS is strictly negative, so that 1 < Λg, proving the contra positive of the claim. 
Lemma 3 Under condition 1, bα is strictly increasing in θ.
Proof: I will show that, under condition 1, the bidder’s objective satisfies strictly in-
creasing differences in (θ, x), so that bα(θ), as the unique maximizer of this objective,
is strictly increasing in θ. Consider
Wα(θ, x) := Pi(x) (θi − x+ ηg (1− Pi(x)) θi − ηmλm (1− Pi(x)) (1− α)x)
+ (1− Pi(x)) (−αx− ηgλgPi(x)θi + ηmPi(x)(1− α)x) .
Differentiating this with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
Wα(θ, x) = Fb−1α (x)
(
1− Λg(1− Fb−1α (x))
)
,
which, since bα (and hence, b−1α ) is strictly increasing, is strictly increasing in x, so
long as Fθ(1 − Λg(1 − Fθ)) is strictly increasing in θ. Condition 1, in conjunction
with lemma 2, guarantees that this is so. 
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